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Sweden stands out as one of few countries without a lockdown and where primary
schools and kindergartens are still open. Only high schools and universities are
closed and people are encouraged to work from home. But no hard restrictions
are in place. Only recently, gatherings of more than 50 people were banned. The
Public Health Agency has set the strategy, despite conflicting views across Sweden
from various medical experts. The overall Corona suppression policy builds almost
entirely on voluntary measures and trust. As the number of Corona cases and
fatalities increase across Sweden, more people are now being tested and there
is less and less talk of (herd) immunity the prevalent paradigm until recently. The
country’s usually good healthcare system is overburdened, doctors, nurses and
other caregivers lack protective gear, and there is chaos in the hospitals. Several
nursing homes have reported Covid-19 deaths and shortage of staff. The ratio
of Corona-related mortality in Sweden is much higher compared to, for example,
Norway, Denmark or Finland, which have implemented much more restrictive and
comprehensive measures early on. Still, of course, no one knows how this will end –
or when. 
The Government has just extended its powers using emergency laws to cover for
Covid-19 related issues, which sparkled some debate in the Parliament but was
ultimately approved. The new emergency laws would give the Government the
power to shut down, for example, shopping centers without having to go through the
ordinary legislative process. The new emergency powers are part of to the Pandemic
law (smittskyddslagen), and gives the Government these extra ordinary powers
to take decisions fast. This may be needed, but as always there are worries when
exceptions are at stake.
Cell phone tracking of infected persons, along the lines of policies implemented in
Israel, South Korea and other EU countries to various degree such as Germany,
Italy, the UK and Austria is also on the table. It has been discussed for some time in
Sweden and should raise a rule of law concern (N Elkin-Koren 2020). Currently in
Sweden cell phone tracking is used only to gather and analyze information related
to movement of people in general in order to determine how travel leads to further
spread of the pandemic; an experiment, it seems. Yet the prospect of extending it to
full blown tracking is also discussed in Sweden. Hence, the question of outsourcing
is highly relevant with regard to the Corona crisis as many countries are tracking
mobile phones and thereby to a large extent involving private actors in these
surveillance related matters. All this is taking place however in a glaring absence of
any real constitutional debate in Sweden. This seems particularly germane in this
context of cell phone tracking. 
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There is a possibility of constitutional review in Swedish law of course, Chapter 11:
14 § of the Basic law (Regeringsformen), which is the tantamount of a constitution. It
sets out the possibility to annul legislation that is contrary to the rights set out in the
Basic laws or in higher law (i.e. EU law or international law obligations). Annulment
can also occur if there is a flaw in the adoption of the law. This is regulated in
Chapter 7:2 § the basic law (Regeringsformen), where it is stated that before new
laws are adopted, they must have been sent out to different authorities across the
country for comments. Subsequently a Council of Legislation with different legal
experts scrutinizes the suggested bill and makes an advisory statement before it can
be presented to the Parliament. This means that the procedure for adopting laws in
Sweden is very slow (and sometimes unreasonably so). 
Needless to say, breach of EU law is also a reason, and an obligation to annul
any conflicting Swedish legislation. In Sweden there is a very strong belief in the
legislative process and judicial review is mostly procedural, the general courts seem
to avoid getting into (what they consider to be) political questions. There are also
administrative courts with a bit different function and with more discretion to alter
authority decisions (see eg Wenander 2019.) As a result of Sweden joining the EU
and having been a party to the European Convention of Human Rights for a very
long time, courts have of course had an obligation for decades, not only to monitor
national laws, but also to honor European constitutional duties and grant individuals
their rights.  
Still there is very little rule of law debate and almost none relating to privacy and data
protection in general. For example, no one seems to question the current system in
Sweden of publishing huge amounts of private information about individuals online,
which has been going on for over a decade.  The authorities pass on personal
information gathered through government powers to various commercial third parties
who pay for the information and get a license (so-called “utgivarbevis”) to use it,
without much public scrutiny. These companies then publish this information online
and claim it is their right under a principle of transparency and the right to publish
(under the Basic laws) which seem to have ran wild, beyond any equilibrium with the
rights to personal autonomy, privacy and eventually human dignity. This includes our
home addresses, the names of the people registered on the same address, where
they moved from, their civil status, what people vote for in the area (aggregately)
and the average income etc., etc. In the name of “transparency,” almost everything
about us is commodified in a vast and opaque market of information.  For a country
that prides itself of respecting EU values and encourages EU solidarity, this is
remarkable as not all EU values and EU legal duties such as data protection are
upheld. This constitutes a constitutional challenge both with regard to EU data
protection (Article 16 TFEU and Article 8 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) and
privacy and dignity as mentioned above. And now with cell phone tracking, will the
authorities also ‘sell’ the information of who has been diagnosed with Corona? Why
not? In the absence of proper checks and balances that are enforced, there is no
guarantee that such information will not be made publicly available, as well. 
The absence of a critical review of information policy is a symptom; the problem
might be that there seems to be no real constitutional debate in Sweden and the
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general courts usually tread very carefully when sensitive questions are at stake.
This academic debate on how much powers court should be vested with, may
sound like a luxury problem, considering much more troubling threats to the rule
of law in countries where emergency laws are blatantly misused. It may also seem
less important in the light of the economic debate on the Euro Corona-bond that is
currently discussed and only partially concluded (in this Blog see e.g. Goldmann
2020), with no joint bonds so far and where regional, let alone global solidarity is on
the verge of being put in Corona isolation. Still it is important for what it tells us about
the idea of a common solidarity in Europe, where EU values are, or should be taken
seriously. Corona and dealing with it do not occur in legal and political vacuum. 
Despite the horrors of the Corona disease, and indeed in order to combat it
efficiently as a society, Sweden requires a robust and healthy constitutional and
democratic debate. Corona is a human disaster and the suffering it spreads has
yet to be accounted for. It is also an unprecedented challenge to our political and
constitutional institutions and our almost nonexistent public discourse. The former
should encourage rather than subvert the latter. We do not want our democracy, in
the sense of a society of free, engaged citizens and a responsive government, to fall
victim to Covid-19 as well. 
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